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The sustainability concept has developed in a policy context. Its main relevance has been 
in policy forums such as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
and the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development. In the realm of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs), sustainability has played a policy role 
in the context of the World Summit on the Information Society. This article asks: How can 
we think of sustainability and ICTs in the context of a critical theory of society? How is the 
sustainability of ICTs related to capitalism and class? It provides a critique of the dominant 
reductionist and dualistic understandings of information technology sustainability in an 
information society context. The question that arises in this context is whether, from a 
critical theory perspective, the sustainability concept should be discarded. The view 
advanced in this article is that a critical social theory should provide an ideology critique of 
information technology sustainability; at the same time, it should not discard, but 
transform, the sustainability concept into a critical notion of un/sustainable information 
technology sustainability in the context of the information society. 
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Sustainability has to do with the question of how present and future generations can lead a good 
life in society (for a review of its genesis, see Fuchs, 2017). It is a concept that has been developed in 
forums such as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development and the United Nations 
Conference on Sustainable Development. In the realm of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs), the sustainability concept has played a role in the context of the World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS). Sustainable ICTs involve the question of whether and how ICTs contribute to and/or harm 
the development of society in ways that allow present and future generations to lead a good life. 
 
                                               
Christian Fuchs: C.Fuchs@westminster.ac.uk 
Date submitted: 2017–01–03 
 
1 The research presented in this article was conducted with funding provided by the EU Horizon 2020 
project netCommons: Network Infrastructure as Commons, http://netcommons.eu/, grant agreement 
number 688768. 
2432  Christian Fuchs International Journal of Communication 11(2017) 
This article asks: How can we think of sustainability and ICTs in the context of a critical theory of 
society? How is the sustainability of ICTs related to capitalism and class? The approach taken stands in the 
tradition of critical sociology, which “seeks to make problematic existing social relations in order to 
uncover the underlying structural explanations for those relations” (Fasenfest, 2007, p. 17). Critical 
sociology is opposed to functionalism, is antipositivist, uses the tradition of critical political economy, asks 
questions of power at large, and deconstructs ideologies (Fasenfest, 2007). Critical sociology is “a critique 
of the social order in the exploration of extant power relationships existing within a society organized 
under the principles of capitalist social relations” (Fasenfest, 2007, p. 22). Its knowledge addresses “how 
to influence change toward a more progressive and positive vision for the future” (Fasenfest, 2007, p. 20). 
Given such a focus, it is evident that critical sociology is an approach suited for the study of 
un/sustainable development. 
 
This article discusses the relationship of technology and capitalism, identifies four ways to think 
about sustainability in the context of the information society, and criticizes reductionist understandings of 
information technology sustainability. It provides a critique of dualistic understandings of information 
technology sustainability. Dualism and reductionism are the predominant mainstream concepts of 
sustainability in an ICT context. This article suggests an alternative framework that uses critical theory as 
the foundation for a critical theory of sustainability in the information society. 
 
Technology and Capitalism 
 
The term technology has its roots in the Greek term techné [τέχνη] (Feenberg, 2006; Reydon, 
2012; Williams, 1983), which means the knowledge, art, and craft of making something. Technology as 
techné was considered in subjective terms oriented to humans’ skills, capacities, and knowledge to create 
something in a purposeful manner and thereby change the world. With the rise of modern large-scale 
industry and machinery, the dominant meaning of the category of technology shifted toward a more 
objective understanding. Technology has come to be understood as things, systems, machines, tools, 
artifacts, and hardware that apply the results of science for controlling humans and nature (see Dusek, 
2006, Chapter 2; Li-Hua, 2009; Williams, 1983).  
 
Georg Lukács (1971) argues that, with the rise of capitalism, “human relations (viewed as the 
objects of social activity) assume increasingly the objective forms of the abstract elements of the 
conceptual systems of natural science and of the abstract substrata of the laws of nature” (p. 131). The 
economy thereby became “transformed into an abstract and mathematically orientated system of formal 
‘laws’” (p. 105) that is governed by “the abstract, quantitative mode of calculability” (p. 93). Technology 
in such a system is a machine that is used for controlling and instrumentalizing nature and human 
activities for partial interests such as corporations’ monetary profits and commodity production, 
bureaucratic power, possessive individualism, and consumerism.  
 
Alfred Sohn-Rethel (1978) argues that this instrumental understanding of knowledge and 
technology goes back to the division of labor between manual and mental labor in class societies. The 
“logic of the market and of mechanistic thinking is a logic of intellectual labour divided from manual 
labour” (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p. 73). For Sohn-Rethel, the logic of mechanistic, quantifying, mathematical 
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reasoning is not something that emerged with the existence of capitalism, but rather is much older. He 
argues that it goes as far back as ancient Greek slavery, which instituted a division between manual labor 
performed by slaves and the mental labor of philosophers, politicians, and scientists: “It is Greek 
philosophy which constitutes the first historical manifestations of the separation of head and hand in this 
particular mode” (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p. 66). This division of labor has, for Sohn-Rethel, to do with the 
rise of the mathematical logic of measurement and quantification. Class society’s division of labor would in 
the realm of thinking and logic be accompanied by quantifying reason and in the realm of the economy by 
exchange value.  
 
In a general understanding, technology is neither knowledge nor a thing, but a process in which 
humans make use of their skills, knowledge, and capacities and of objects to change the world in an 
intentional and purposeful manner. In modern class society, technology is no longer a human-controlled 
means for human-defined ends. Means and ends are reversed: Humanity is not an end in itself, but 
humans have become means and instruments for dominant classes ’ partial interests (Fuchs, 2016, 
Chapter 15). Technology is in this context an instrument for domination. Capital, including technology as 
its means of production, is a subject that dominates labor. Technology is in such a system not a means to 
humane ends, but rather serves a specific instrumental aim—namely, capital accumulation—and as part of 
this end, it turns humans into objects.  
 
The instrumental character of technology is not inherent in technology as such or in society in 
general, but rather has to do with how partial interests shape technology and society. Technology is not 
neutral and value-free, but embedded into power structures, contradictions, and struggles that shape its 
invention, design, application, and use. This also means that technologies can be redesigned, reinvented, 
changed, repurposed, abolished, and so on. Putting technologies to humane and democratic use requires 
shaping society, invention, design, application, and use by humane and democratic values. It requires a 
political struggle for alternative technological and alternative frameworks that benefit all humans. 
 
ICTs are means that humans use for creating, disseminating, and consuming information about 
the world. The computer and networked computer systems are particular technologies that, unlike 
traditional media (radio, television, newspapers, etc.), allow not just the consumption of information but 
its production, coproduction, and dissemination. 
 
The networked computer allows the convergence of the production, dissemination, and 
consumption of information in one tool. Given that technology is not independent from society, we cannot 
speak of the sustainability of technology only in technological terms; rather, we need to connect this topic 
to society. A computer-controlled atom bomb is a particular political technology used for threatening 
actual or potential enemies. Its existence has to do with political power relations in the world. Defining 
technological sustainability immanently would mean that the atom bomb would be sustainable if it works 
error-free; has comprehensive usability; and can be controlled with the help of a user-friendly, secure, 
and stable computer interface. The problem of such an understanding is, however, that the computer-
controlled atom bomb is inherently political and conflicts with the goal of a peaceful global society. It is 
politically unsustainable. 
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Such immanent definitions of technological sustainability that stay in the realm of technology 
without considering society often take on ideological forms. Mulder, Ferrer, and van Lente (2011) argue 
that technological sustainability is not an end in itself: “Rather, sustainability of a technology can only be 
determined through a socio-political process” (p. 242). 
 
Computer technology cannot simply be made sustainable by changing chips, cables, variables, 
codes, or algorithms. Sustainable computing is not a technological matter because computing is 
embedded into environmental, economic, political, and cultural contexts of design, production, and use. It 
is therefore necessary to discuss the topic of computing and sustainability in the context of the 
information society. Making computing sustainable requires shaping technology and society in an 
integrated manner (cf. Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987; MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999). 
 
Such an understanding of technology underlies the philosopher Ivan Illich’s (1973) book Tools for 
Conviviality. He argues that it is dangerous to base society on what is technologically possible and not on 
what is politically and ethically feasible. Illich argues that both society and technology need to be 
redesigned in an integrated manner, and he writes of convivial tools in a convivial society: “Such a 
society, in which modern technologies serve politically interrelated individuals rather than managers, I will 
call ‘convivial’. . . . I have chosen ‘convivial’ as a technical term to designate a modern society of 
responsibly limited tools” (p. 12). We cannot assume that technological developments are automatically 
societally responsible. Sustainability and technology development should be seen as two interlinked social 
and political tasks. One can certainly see the critique of unsustainable developments and technologies as a 
political task. At the same time, reflecting on the implications of critical technology assessment for society 
and the construction of technology is an important political task. Schot and Rip (1996) argue in this 
context that constructive technology assessment and sociotechnical criticism are inherently connected. 
 
For Illich, the problem is that technological innovations have the danger to blind people to 
potential negative consequences. Their all-too-optimistic adoption can backfire and result in unforeseen 
consequences. In an argument comparable to Illich’s, Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) argue that 
enlightenment reason can turn negatively against itself and have dangerous consequences. They call this 
the dialectic of the enlightenment. The implication of the problems that technologies can entail is to take 
an approach that tries to actively limit negative consequences by designing society and technology in 
human-centered ways. Such designs do not think primarily about what is “good for institutions” (Illich, 
1973, p. 25), but about what is good for all humans.  
 
Four Approaches to Understanding Sustainability in the Information Society 
 
Discussions about the un/sustainability of information technology’s role in society have especially 
emerged since the First World Summit on the Information Society that was held in two phases in 2003 
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Table 1. Approaches to Sustainability and Information Society Policies (Based on Fuchs, 2010). 
Type of approach  Description 
Reductionism Ecology, economy, or technology are considered the driving forces of a 
sustainable information society. 
Projectivism  Politics and/or culture are seen as the determinant forces of a sustainable 
information society. 
Dualism Multiple dimensions and goals of a sustainable information society are 
identified, but are not causally related to one another.  
Dialectic Multiple dialectically interrelated dimensions and goals of a sustainable 
information society are identified, existing contradictions of these dimensions 
are analyzed, and changes are seen as integral, interdependent, and systemic. 
 
 
We can classify information society policy discourses according to how they relate the domains of 
ecology and the economy to the realms of politics and culture. According to the information philosopher 
Wolfgang Hofkirchner (2013), there are four ways to explain the relationship of two categories, C1 and C2 
(see Table 1): reductionism, projectivism, disjunctivism/dualism, and dialectical integrativism. 
Reductionism causally reduces the relation C1–C2 to C1. Projectivism projects causality into C2. Dualistic 
thought argues that C1 and C2 have independent causalities. A dialectical approach sees C1 and C2 as 
relatively autonomous and mutually constituting each other. In a dialectic, C1 and C2 are identical and 
nonidentical at the same time. I have in other publications elaborated on and applied, based on 
Hofkirchner’s typology, a distinction of four information society policy discourses (Fuchs, 2010; Verdegem 
& Fuchs, 2013). 
 
Reductionist approaches see ecological or technological or economic developments (e.g., GDP 
investment in information technology and the information economy) as the sole driving forces of the 
un/sustainable information society. Projectivist approaches see the political and/or cultural system as the 
determining forces of un/sustainability in the information age. Reductionism sees the physical aspects of 
society as determining, whereas projectivism assumes that the realms of human ideas and politics are 
determine society’s development. Dualistic approaches define multiple goals and dimensions of a(n) 
un/sustainable information society, but they do not consider whether these goals are compatible and 
whether and how they are causally linked. Dialectical approaches see the various dimensions and goals of 
un/sustainability in the information society as interdependent, mutually causally linked, and only relatively 
autonomous. 
 
Projectivism is an approach that is rarely found in ICT policy discourses on sustainability, because 
the notion of sustainability originates in the environmental realm and this kind of discourse tends to be 
associated with industry interests. Therefore, either the ecological dimension or the economic dimension 
or both normally tend to play a role. Theoretically, ICT sustainability could, of course, be conceived in 
purely political or cultural terms with a focus on either digital democracy or fostering online 
understanding. Reductionist understandings are much more common than projectionist ones. 
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Reductionist Understandings of Sustainability in the Information Society 
 
Hilty and Ruddy (2010) reject multidimensional definitions of sustainability in general and in the 
ICT context in particular, because they argue that nature is the most fundamental dimension of human 
survival. They write that “multidimensionality mitigates the radical nature of SD” (p. 11). They define the 
central concern of sustainable development as the “sustainability dilemma”—that is, “the physical 
impossibility of extending the present consumption patterns of the industrialized countries to all parts of 
the world without putting a great burden on future generations” (p. 10)—and reduce the sustainability of 
information technology to the ecological dimension. 
 
The emergence of ICTs and the Internet has not dematerialized the economy. The depletion of 
nonrenewable natural resources and the massive emission of carbon dioxide continue. Ecological 
catastrophe is certainly an important challenge in the information society. But assuming that we had 
solved this problem, other ways of destroying humanity could nonetheless persist, especially politically 
and ideologically motivated wars and spirals of violence that, in escalation, could result in the large-scale 
use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that could wipe out humanity. Economic crises also have 
the potential to render the lives of many people precarious and can lead to political crises—and, in the last 
instance, also to wars. The example of dematerialization’s promises shows that, in a society, where groups 
compete for resources (including capital, influence, attention, and support), technological determinism is 
used as a means in the struggle for mobilizing resources for political interests. 
 
Hilty and Ruddy (2010) create the impression that the environmental crisis is the only problem 
that needs to be solved in the information age. Their approach is a form of environmental reductionism. 
We also cannot exclude the possibility that it may indeed be possible to universalize today’s per capita 
quantity of physical consumption to all humans if it is at the same time possible to make a large-scale 
qualitative shift to green energy and renewable resource use. Given that there is more than one 
dimension that threatens the existence of humanity and the attainability of a good society, a one-
dimensional use of the category of the sustainable information society is not feasible. 
 
The European Union in 2010 introduced its new information society policy called A Digital Agenda 
for Europe, in which it formulates a policy strategy and goals it wants to reach until 2020: “The overall 
aim of the Digital Agenda is to deliver sustainable economic and social benefits from a digital single 
market based on fast and ultra fast internet and interoperable applications” (European Commission, 2010, 
p. 3). The notion of sustainability is here used as meaning both (a) the continuous growth of profits and 
the GDP as well as (b) the continuous guarantee of social cohesion. There is no consideration that there 
may be an antagonism between, on the one side, the focus on companies ’ profits, which in past decades 
has in most parts of the world meant a neoliberal policy agenda, and, on the other side, the increasing 
social inequalities that have come along with neoliberalism. The overall aim formulated in the Digital 
Agenda is both economically reductionist and technologically deterministic: The EU assumes that the 
combination of the Internet and neoliberalism automatically brings about economic and social 
sustainability. 
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The EU expresses its view that the Internet in Europe is not developed enough, is not fast 
enough, and that the uptake is not wide enough:  
 
More needs to be done to ensure the roll-out and take-up of broadband for all, at 
increasing speeds, through both fixed and wireless technologies, and to facilitate 
investment in the new very fast open and competitive internet networks that will be the 
arteries of a future economy. Our action needs to be focused on providing the right 
incentives to stimulate private investment, complemented by carefully targeted public 
investments, without re-monopolising our networks, as well as improving spectrum 
allocation. (European Commission, 2010, p. 6) 
 
One of the EU’s keywords for creating sustainability is the focus on a “vibrant digital single 
market” for Internet services, digital content, and “telecom services” (European Commission, 2010, p. 7), 
which includes Internet access and infrastructure:  
 
We need very fast Internet for the economy to grow strongly and to create jobs and 
prosperity, and to ensure citizens can access the content and services they want. The 
future economy will be a network-based knowledge economy with the internet at its 
centre. Europe needs widely available and competitively-priced fast and ultra fast 
internet access. The Europe 2020 Strategy has underlined the importance of broadband 
deployment to promote social inclusion and competitiveness in the EU. (pp. 18–19, 
emphasis in original)  
 
The EU has the objective to achieve “broadband for all” (European Commission, 2010, p. 26) and wants to 
specifically foster the deployment of next-generation access networks (p. 20), which are Internet 
networks that have a download speed of more than 24 megabits per second. The EU strategy in this 
respect is to “encourage market investment in open and competitive networks” (p. 20). 
 
The EU overall fosters a neoliberal approach to digital society’s sustainability. There are, of 
course, exceptions, such as the EU research project netCommons (http://www.netcommons.eu), which 
stresses the need for alternative technological, legal, political, social, ethical, and economic frameworks 
for advancing the sustainability of the information society. The EU sees capitalist businesses as the key to 
providing Internet access and services and sees Internet capitalism as the source of the growth of 
economic profitability and the creation of wealth and social inclusion. In the quotes above, social goals are 
reduced to an economic dimension: the advancement of digital capitalism. The Digital Agenda overlooks 
that capitalist investments in Internet access and services do not guarantee social cohesion. Capital has 
the inherent drive to increase itself and, as one of its means for accumulation, tends to aim at reducing 
wage costs. Precarious and unpaid digital labor—that is, labor that produces digital media technologies 
and services—has been one of the effects of the capitalist Internet economy (Fuchs, 2014b). 
 
Regional development is an aspect of sustainable development. If certain regions are significantly 
worse off than others, then regional inequality constitutes a form of unsustainability. The EU considers 
regions that have a per capita GDP lower than 75% of the EU average less developed. In 2014–20, this 
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includes all of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia as well as parts of 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, southern Italy, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom (Cornwall, west Wales). Figure 1 illustrates these regions and shows that they are especially 
located in Europe’s south and east, which is an indication of uneven development in Europe. As shown in 
Table 2, less developed regions, sparsely populated areas, poor households, and individuals with low 





Figure 1. Less developed regions in Europe shown in orange, 2014–2020.  
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ICT professionals 92 – – – 3 
Manual workers 72 – – – 17 









81 97 95 97 5 
Households in 
sparsely populated 
areas (< 100 
inhabitants/km2) 
– – 73 77 23 
Note. All data are from Eurostat (2016a). EU-28 refers to all 28 countries in the European Union. 
a Data for this category are for 2013. 
 
 
Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate the geographical access to the Internet in Europe. The figures 
indicate that there is less Internet use in less developed regions. Tables 3 and 4 show the regions in 
Europe that in 2015 had the largest percentage of citizens who had never used a computer and the lowest 
use of broadband Internet. The tables again indicate that it is the southern and eastern regions of Europe 
that have the lowest computer and Internet use. 
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Figure 2. Percentage of Europeans who have never  
used the Internet, 2014 (source: Eurostat, 2016b). 
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Figure 3. Percentage of Europeans who regularly  
used the Internet in 2014 (source: Eurostat, 2016b). 
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Figure 4. Percentage of European households that had  
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Table 3. Regions in the European Union Where in 2015 Less  
Than 60% of Households Had Broadband Access at Home. 
Region % 
Severozapaden, Bulgaria 45 
North and South Bulgaria 55 
Severoiztochen, Bulgaria 56 
Yuzhen tsentralen, Bulgaria 56 
Corsica, France 57 
Macroregiunea, Romania 57 
Nord-Est, Romania 57 
Sud-Est, Romania 57 
Severen tsentralen, Bulgaria 58 
Yugoiztochen, Bulgaria 58 
Central Greece 59 
Note. All data are from Eurostat (2016a). 
 
 
Table 4. Regions in the European Union Where in 2015  
40% or More Have Never Used a Computer. 
Region % 
Severozapaden, Bulgaria 49 
Campania, Italy 42 
Apulia, Italy 42 
Sud, Romania 40 
Molise, Italy 40 
Sicily, Italy 40 
Note. All data are from Eurostat (2016a). 
 
 
Given the existence of a digital divide in Europe between poor citizens and regions on the one 
side and rich citizens and regions on the other side, the question arises whether an approach that fosters 
private ownership and for-profit operation of Internet networks is suited for overcoming such divides. For 
profit means that operators charge for network access. Access is organized as a commodity. Given income 
inequality, people with lower income are less likely to afford the same level and speed of access than 
those who are better off. Capitalist markets necessarily bring access inequalities with them. 
 
The EU, however, predominantly follows a market approach in the creation of fast broadband 
networks. In 2014, the EU announced the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), a plan of 
investing €315 billion into broadband infrastructure, transport, education, research, and innovation in 
2015–17 as a combination of public funding and private investment (Jackson, 2014). About 80% of this 
amount comes from private investors, and the rest comes from the European Investment Bank and the 
European Investment Fund (European Commission, 2016):  
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The Investment Plan for Europe adopted in November 2014 as the first major initiative 
of the Juncker Commission has the potential to bring investments back in line with its 
historical trends. Via the EFSI, the European Investment Bank is able to respond quickly 
to financing needs in areas where alternative sources of financing are scarce or 
unavailable. The Bank’s presence often provides reassurance to other financiers to 
provide co-financing. The EFSI projects need to be economically and technically viable, 
consistent with Union policies, provide additionality (i.e. they could not be realized 
without the backing of the EU guarantee), and maximise the mobilisation of private 
sector capital. (p. 3) 
 
The president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, commented:  
 
We need to pursue fiscal responsibility and keep public finances sustainable. We also 
need to restore investment levels to overcome the crisis, to kick-start growth and 
sustain it. . . . We have to . . . stimulate private capital. We cannot spend money we do 
not have. So this is an offer to the private sector where the money is . . . to join the 
efforts we are developing. (European Commission, n.d.) 
 
The discussion reveals a policy regime in Europe that tends to foster Internet infrastructure and 
access as commodity. There is not just unequal access to the Internet in Europe, but large market 
concentration in the broadband market. Since 2012, more than €60 billion was spent on mergers and 
acquisitions of telecommunications operators in the EU. In eight of 28 EU countries, the incumbent 
controls more than 50% of all broadband subscribers: Luxemburg, Cyprus, Austria, Denmark, Estonia, 
Latvia, Croatia, and Lithuania. For all of Europe, incumbents control 41% of the subscribers (European 
Commission, 2015). Table 5 provides an overview of the dominant market player’s share in broadband 
subscription for all European countries. 
 





where f = number of firms participating in an industry, and 
Sij = each firm i’s market share in the industry j. 
 
HHI < 1,000 indicates low market concentration. 
1,000 < HHI < 1,800 indicates moderate market concentration. 
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Table 5. Market Share of the Incumbent in Fixed-Line Broadband Subscriptions  
and Minimum Level of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 2015. 
Country Market share (%) HHI > 
Luxembourg 69 4,761 
Cyprus 64 4,096 
Austria 58 3,364 
Denmark 58 3,364 
Estonia 58 3,364 
Latvia 58 3,364 
Croatia 53 2,809 
Lithuania 51 2,601 
Malta 49 2,401 
Portugal 48 2,304 
Italy 48 2,304 
Spain 45 2,025 
Belgium 44 1,936 
Hungary 44 1,936 
Greece 43 1,849 
Germany 42 1,764 
Netherlands 41 1,681 
France 39 1,521 
Sweden 39 1,521 
Ireland 37 1,369 
Slovenia 35 1,225 
Slovakia 34 1,156 
United Kingdom 32 1,024 
Poland 32 1,024 
Czech Republic 29 841 
Romania 27 729 
Bulgaria 23 529 
Average in EU 44 2,106 
Note. Data are from European Commission (2015). HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. 
 
The calculations of the HHI in Table 6 show minimum levels. We can infer from them that in at 
least 15 of 27 EU countries for which data are available, the broadband market was highly concentrated in 
2015. The average EU HHI in the broadband market is at least 2,106, which is a very high level.  
 
Mobile broadband has a relatively small share of the broadband market: In 2014, only 8.3% of 
the homes in the EU used mobile Internet connections for accessing the Internet (European Commission, 
2015). Table 6 shows that the average minimum HHI for the mobile communications market in 25 EU 
countries in 2014 was 1,753. Given that this is a minimum value based on the market share of only the 
incumbent, we can assume that the actual value is higher than 1,800 and that the European mobile 
communications market is highly concentrated. 
2446  Christian Fuchs International Journal of Communication 11(2017) 
Table 6. Market Share of the Incumbent in Mobile Network Subscriptions  
and Minimum Level of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 2014. 
Country Market share (%) HHI > 
Cyprus 66 4,338 
Luxembourg 55 2,973 
Slovenia 48 2,345 
Portugal 47 2,246 
Croatia 46 2,146 
Hungary 45 2,049 
Malta 44 1,968 
Romania 44 1,933 
Lithuania 43 1,815 
Austria 42 1,776 
Latvia 42 1,769 
Slovakia 42 1,734 
Estonia 41 1,665 
Finland 40 1,587 
Czech Republic 39 1,556 
Denmark 39 1,524 
Ireland 38 1,439 
Bulgaria 37 1,369 
Germany 37 1,369 
Sweden 36 1,299 
France 33 1,106 
Spain 32 1,025 
Italy 32 996 
United Kingdom 30 900 
Poland 30 888 
European Union 41 1,753 
Note. Data on digital key indicators are from Eurostat (2016a). Data for Germany 
and the United Kingdom are from Ofcom (2015). HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index. 
 
Strong market concentration means that economic power is asymmetrically distributed. Single 
companies have economic advantages at the expense of workers in other companies in the same sector, 
whose economic survival is threatened. Market concentration also enables price control. An economy 
characterized by corporate monopolies or oligopolies can therefore not be considered sustainable. The EU 
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is dominated by a profit-oriented telecommunications and Internet model, in which large 
telecommunications corporations have a lot of power. Given that the capitalist development of the 
Internet market has resulted in high broadband market concentration, the question arises whether it is 
wise to further foster the market model in building new infrastructure or whether alternative models are 
needed. The EU’s strategy to try to stimulate private investments into Internet infrastructure can easily 
enforce further market concentration: Investments into communications infrastructure is very expensive 
because it involves the digging of trenches and the laying of fiber cables and ducts. Only companies with 
vast amounts of capital can undertake such investments. Given a high concentration of communications 
markets, as in Europe, the most likely investors into new communications infrastructure are the 
incumbent players, which strengthens their market advantages and makes it more likely that they also 
dominate the new markets, which then reinforces capital concentration.  
 
The EU example shows that fostering private investments with the help of public aid in an overall 
highly concentrated economic realm such as communications tends to reinforce concentration. We can 
therefore speak of a vicious cycle of capital concentration in the communications infrastructure market. 
Furthermore, communications corporations such as Verizon, Vodafone, EE, O2 (see Garside & Griffiths, 
2013a, 2013b; Syal, 2013), Hutchison, Tele Columbus, Tele2, and Telecom Italia (Galizia, Cabra, Williams, 
Díaz-Struck, & Rudder, 2014) seem to have avoided paying taxes in Europe. The argument that private 
investment is needed because public finances are under strain overlooks the fact that public funding could 
certainly be increased if tax avoidance structures could be overcome and large corporations be made 
accountable.  
  
Such processes constitute together a vicious cycle of neoliberalism that operates in the 
communications market and other markets (see Figure 5): Neoliberal policies and ideology foster the 
commodification of services, society’s resources, and infrastructures (Harvey, 2005). The result is the 
emergence of capitalist markets. Markets in general have a tendency to concentrate and form oligopolistic 
and monopolistic structures. Communications markets are affected by concentration in a particular way: 
Investment into network infrastructures and information technologies is expensive, which fosters 
concentration. Advertising-funded media tend to attract advertisers if they attract large numbers of 
viewers, readers, listeners, and users, which fosters the concentration of advertising via an advertising–
audience share spiral (Furhoff, 1973). Selling media content is a high-risk business, in which survival is 
difficult. All of these mechanisms foster concentration of communications markets. Neoliberalism also 
fosters a tendency for corporate tax avoidance that, together with concentration tendencies, strengthens 
the power of corporations. Building, maintaining, and operating communications infrastructure is 
expensive. Given market concentration, especially existing incumbent operators tend to be able to afford 
necessary investments so that dominant market actors tend also to control new communications 
infrastructures. Corporate tax avoidance not only strengthens the financial power of corporations but also 
puts pressure on public finances to further foster neoliberal policy agendas. Increasing corporate power 
fosters the tendency that corporations are enabled to threaten state institutions to withdraw or outsource 
their capital, which may result in unemployment. The neoliberal competition state competes with other 
states for attracting capital and so tends to foster ever more commodification, privatization, and market 
liberalization. The outcome is a vicious cycle of neoliberalism, in which neoliberal policy and ideology, 
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capitalist markets, market concentration, and corporate power are reinforced. The example analysis shows 
that such a vicious cycle operates in the European Union’s information society. 
 
Overall, the example of broadband markets in Europe confirms the analysis that the EU’s Digital 
Agenda is based on a neoliberal economic reductionism that fosters the market and capitalism in the 
realm of digital media and sees the market as primary force for sustainability (for a critique of 
































Figure 5. The vicious cycle of neoliberalism. 
 
 
Dualistic Understandings of Sustainability in the Information Society 
 
A third type of information society policy discourse is dualistic in character. WSIS was a summit 
that the United Nations organized. It took place in two phases with one event in 2003 in Geneva, 
Switzerland, and another in 2005 in Tunis, Tunisia.  
 
WSIS identified the potential of ICTs to eradicate hunger and poverty and foster education, 
gender equality, health care, environmental sustainability, peace, prosperity, freedom, democracy, human 
understanding, cultural diversity, and human rights (WSIS, 2003a, Sections 2, 3, 51). It argued that GDP 
growth and social equality can be advanced at the same time through ICTs: 
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Under favourable conditions, these technologies can be a powerful instrument, 
increasing productivity, generating economic growth, job creation and employability and 
improving the quality of life of all. They can also promote dialogue among people, 
nations and civilizations. (WSIS, 2003a, Section 9) 
 
WSIS’s logic of argumentation is dualistic because it assumes that, through ICT development, 
both capitalist growth and social equality can be achieved at the same time. ICT development is seen as a 
realm of capitalist investment, both in developed and developing countries: WSIS promoted ICT and 
Internet development in developing countries through the support of foreign direct investment and 
transfer of information technology (WSIS, 2003a, Section 40; see also WSIS, 2005a, Sections 54, 90b). It 
encouraged “private-sector participation” (WSIS, 2005a, Section 13) and identified a “powerful 
commercial basis for ICT infrastructural investment” in developing countries (Section 14). It wanted to 
“promote and foster entrepreneurship” in the realm of ICTs in developing countries (WSIS, 2005a, Section 
90b) and wrote of “sustainable private-sector investment in infrastructure” (Section 20). We find here a 
peculiar understanding of sustainability as “private-sector investment in infrastructure.” Sustainability is 
not related to the common good that benefits all, but to the growth of the profits of private companies 
that own Internet infrastructure. In a comparative passage, WSIS called for “adequate and sustainable 
investments in ICT infrastructure and services” (WSIS, 2005a, Section 8). WSIS simultaneously calls for 
both private ownership and social benefits for all. 
 
In contrast to WSIS, the winners of the Noble Prize in Economics, Joseph Stiglitz (winner in 2001) 
and Amartya Sen (winner in 1998), argue that capitalist growth is no guarantee for social justice as an 
aspect of sustainability. Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2010) write that the GDP is of limited use for 
measuring social progress and that it is “an inadequate metric to gauge well-being over time” (p. 8). 
Measuring well-being by the GDP could, for example, “send the aberrant message that a natural 
catastrophe is a blessing for the economy, because of the additional economic activity generated by 
repairs” (Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, 2010, p. 265). They call for a shift in emphasis “from measuring 
economic production to measuring people’s well-being“ (p. 12, emphasis in original) in policy making and 
research in the context of sustainability.  
 
The WSIS meetings in 2003 and 2005 were based on a neoliberal policy agenda that advances a 
dualistic agenda that sees social sustainability and capitalist growth of profits as achievable by capitalist 
ownership and development of ICT infrastructure. Since the rise of neoliberal politics that advanced 
privatization, the commodification of common goods and public services: market liberalization, and the 
deregulation of social policies, inequality understood as the distribution of income between labor and 
capital and between the rich and the poor, resource inequality, and inequality of health and death has 
increased:  
 
In March 2008, before the bubble burst, Forbes magazine listed 1,125 of the world’s 
billionaires. Together, they owned $4.4 trillion. That was almost the entire national 
income of 128 million Japanese or a third of the income of 302 million Americans. 
(Therborn, 2012, p. 584) 
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The WSIS propagated a so-called multistakeholder approach that in Internet governance fosters 
the cooperation of “governments, the private sector, civil society and other stakeholders, including the 
international financial institutions” (WSIS, 2003a, Section 60; see also WSIS, 2005a, Sections 29, 34, 80, 
83, 97, 98). Such formulations create the impression that these actors possess equal shares of power in 
the world. Transnational corporations have significant shares of money, reputation, and influence and may 
therefore be more capable than civil society actors of being heard in policy debates and policy 
formulations. It is therefore not a surprise that, in contrast to the official multistakeholder documents 
published by WSIS in 2003 and 2005 that have a corporate-friendly character, the 2003 Civil Society 
Declaration to the World Summit on the Information Society formulated a different vision:  
 
Full participation in information and communication societies requires us to reject at a 
fundamental level, the solely profit-motivated and market-propelled promotion of ICTs 
for development. Conscious and purposeful actions need to be taken in order to ensure 
that new ICTs are not deployed to further perpetuate existing negative trends of 
economic globalisation and market monopolisation. (WSIS, 2003b, p. 7)  
 
WSIS saw public-service investment and provision of Internet access as feasible only in poor 
regions: “We recognize that public finance plays a crucial role in providing ICT access and services to rural 
areas and disadvantaged populations including those in Small Island Developing States and Landlocked 
Developing Countries” (WSIS, 2005a, Section 21). It did not consider that capitalist ownership of 
communications infrastructure tends to be, as we have already seen, economically highly concentrated, 
which means a high concentration of power and private wealth. Public service infrastructure in a world of 
high inequality and concentrated capitalist ownership may therefore be a feasible alternative not just for 
developing regions. The argument that the public should only step in where private investors cannot easily 
make profits overlooks the fact that the market also fails in other areas, where transnational corporations 
make large profits and such accumulation results in market concentration.  
 
Ten years after the WSIS, the WSIS+10 High Level Event conducted a progress review (Geneva, 
June 10–13, 2014) and published outcome documents. The approach had not changed after 10 years, and 
it remains dualist: ICTs are “cross-cutting enablers for achieving the three pillars of sustainable 
development” (WSIS, 2014, p. 10). WSIS+10 recognizes some problems, such as the gender digital 
divide, the lack of youth empowerment, the lack of Internet access in the least developed countries, that 
the voluntary digital solidarity fund does not work, e-waste, and privacy issues resulting from mass 
surveillance. But overall it is just like the WSIS outcome documents in 2003 and 2005—overconfident that 
capitalism and the market are the right way to social and economic progress. 
 
The WSIS agenda is still dualist: “ICTs should be fully recognized as tools empowering people, 
and providing economic growth” (WSIS, 2014, p. 12). And it is also still neoliberal, although the new 
world economic crisis has shed doubts on this approach. “To attract private investment, competition and 
adequate market liberalization policies to develop the infrastructure, financing, and new business models 
need to be studied and deployed, taking into account national circumstances” (WSIS, 2014, p. 36). “We 
recognize the critical importance of private sector investment in information and communications 
technology infrastructure, content and services, and we encourage Governments to create legal and 
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regulatory frameworks conducive to increased investment and innovation” (United Nations General 
Assembly, 2015, Section 38). 
 
WSIS simply ignores certain important issues that concern the development of the information 
society and show the latter’s contradictions in capitalism: the concentrated wealth of the rich (including 
the owners and chief executive officers of the largest transnational communications corporations), 
precarious labor (especially in the younger generation), computerization- and automation-induced 
unemployment, the crisis of capitalism, profit/wage inequality, income and wealth inequality, the 
concentration of ownership in the communications industries, unpaid and precarious digital and 
crowdsourced labor, communications corporations’ tax avoidance, and so on.  
 
In 2015, there were 241 information companies among the world’s 2,000 largest transnational 
companies.2 Together they had combined profits of US$537.3 billion (Forbes, 2015). These profits 
exceeded the combined GDP of the world’s 33 least developed countries (US$474.0 billion) and the 
combined GDP of the world’s 74 smallest economies (US$536.2 billion) (United Nations, 2015 [GDP at 
market prices in current U.S. dollars]). Table 7 lists the world’s 10 most profitable transnational 
information corporations in 2015.  
 
Table 7. The World’s Most Profitable Transnational Information Corporations, 2015. 
 Forbes 
rank 
Company Industry Profits 2015  
(billion US$) 
1 40 Vodafone Telecommunications 77.4 
2 12 Apple Computer hardware 44.5 
3 18 Samsung Electronics Semiconductors 21.9 
4 25 Microsoft Software and programming 20.7 
5 20 China Mobile Telecommunications 17.7 
6 39 Google Computer services 13.7 
7 44 IBM Computer services 12.0 
8 67 Intel Semiconductors 11.7 
9 88 Oracle Software and programming 10.8 
10 22 Verizon Telecommunications 9.6 
    Total: 240.0 
Note. Data are from Forbes (2015) 
 
The combined profits of the world’s 10 largest transnational information corporations (US$240.0 
billion) are larger than the combined GDP of the world’s 16 least developed countries (US$229.2 billion) 
and larger than the combined GDP of the world’s 54 smallest economies (US$234.2 billion; United 
Nations, 2015 Data [GDP at market prices in current U.S. dollars]). Vodafone was, in 2015, the world’s 
                                               
2 The following industries were for this purpose classified as information industries: advertising, 
broadcasting and cable, communications equipment, computer and electronics retail, computer hardware, 
computer services, computer storage devices, consumer electronics, electronics, Internet retail, printing 
and publishing, semiconductors, software and programming, and telecommunications. 
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most profitable transnational information corporation. Its profits amounted to US$77.4 billion. Vodafone’s 
profits were larger than the individual economic performance of 114 of the world’s countries (World Bank 
Data, GDP at market prices in current U.S. dollars for 2015), including populous countries such as Ethiopia 
(100 million inhabitants), the Democratic Republic of Congo (75 million), Tanzania (52 million), Kenya (45 
million), and Uganda (38 million) (United Nations, 2015). Vodafone, a British telecommunications 
company that uses “a Luxembourg entity to reduce tax bills,” according to reports, paid no corporation tax 
in 2014/2015 (Ungoed-Thomas, 2016, p. 14).  
 
These data show the power of transnational information corporations. They are very profitable 
companies. Their individual economic power is often larger than that of entire countries. Their profitability 
is often enhanced by tax avoidance. At the same time, there is large inequality between profits and 
wages, and neoliberalism and austerity measures have resulted in cuts of social expenditures and the 
rollback and privatization of public services. Talking about the sustainability of the information society 
without talking about the profits of information corporations and the wealth of the rich, as the World 
Summit on the Information Society does, has a quite ideological character. Dualistic thought formulates 
the goal of corporate profitability together with a wish list of social equality goals and ignores the 
contradiction between the first and the second. Can there be an alternative, critical understanding of 
sustainability in an information society and information technology context? 
 
Conclusion: Toward a Critical, Dialectical Understanding of  
Sustainability in the Information Society 
  
This article argues that there are two dominant versions of ICT sustainability discourse: 
neoliberal reductionism and neoliberal dualism. They have in common a similar role in society as 
ideologies that try to legitimize the dominant way of how corporations and politicians organize information 
technologies as instruments for corporate and bureaucratic control.  
 
Habermas (1968/1989) stresses in this context, based on Herbert Marcuse (1964), that 
technology becomes a form of technological rationality that is a form of domination and ideology. The 
analysis presented in this article reveals that Marcuse and Habermas ’s insights about technological 
rationality remain highly relevant in the time of social computing, the Internet, cloud computing, the 
Internet of things, and big data. Reductionist and dualist versions of ICT sustainability are one-
dimensional and instrumental concepts of the relationship between information technology and society. 
They are means for domination and ideological legitimation. Langdon Winner (1986) speaks of 
“mythinformation” as the “conviction that a widespread adoption of computers and communication 
systems along with easy access to electronic information will automatically produce a better world for 
human living” (p. 105). My thin formation is the ideology of those “who build, maintain, operate, improve, 
and market” (p. 113) as well as regulate and analyze computing systems in an instrumental manner. 
Reductionist and dualist versions of ICT sustainability believe in specific versions of mythinformation—
namely, that the combination of computing and capitalism will produce a better world.  
 
Winner (1986) describes how, in respect to computing, political questions such as “How can we 
live gracefully and with justice?” (p. 162), “Are we going to design and build circumstances that enlarge 
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possibilities for growth in human freedom, sociability, intelligence, creativity, and self-government? Or are 
we headed in an altogether different direction?” (p. 17), or “How can we limit modern technology to match 
our best sense of who we are and the kind of world we would like to build?” (p. xi) are often simply not 
asked. Today, the moral values of computing are discussed in the context of buzzwords such as 
sustainability and corporate social responsibility. Corporations, managers, bureaucrats and 
instrumentalists can no longer simply ignore moral philosophy. Today, moral questions tend to be asked, 
but the answers remain one-dimensional and naive, often stressing that information technology will fix 
society’s problems (technological reductionism), or capitalist adoption of information technology will fix 
society’s problems (economic reductionism), or we want to have capitalism, capitalist information 
technologies, and a good society (dualism).  
 
Critical theorists of technology and society share the insight that alternative models of technology 
and society that transcend instrumental reason are needed. Marcuse writes in this context of the need for 
dialectical rationality (Marcuse, 1964) and technologies of liberation (Marcuse, 1969), Habermas 
(1968/1989) of communicative action, Illich (1973) of convivial tools, and Raymond Williams (1976) of 
democratic communications. Winner (1986, Chapters 4 and 5) reminds us in his critique of decentralized, 
appropriate technologies that there is no alternative technology fix and no alternative consumer culture fix 
to society’s problems. “Appropriate technologists were unwilling to face squarely the facts of organized 
social and political power” (Winner, 1986, p. 80). The implications for alternative computing, networking, 
and online and Internet technologies today are that centralized power exists in a technologically 
decentralized world and that alternative digital technologies require not just alternative designs that foster 
democratic alternatives but also struggles for the democratization of the institutions, contexts, and society 
in which alt-tech is used. The struggle for alternative technologies must at the same time be the struggle 
for an alternative society, a participatory democracy. 
 
A dialectical perspective on the information society is based on these insights and sees 
unsustainable development as the result of contradictions in society that are mediated by information 
technology and result in destruction and inequalities. Table 8 gives an overview of the dimensions of 
un/sustainable ICTs and an un/sustainable information society.  
 
What do we mean if we speak of a dialectic (for a more detailed discussion, see Fuchs, 2011, 
Chapter 2.4; Fuchs, 2014a)? A dialectic is a contradictory relationship between two entities. They 
simultaneously are identical and different. They require and exclude each other. Dialectical logic 
challenges classical binary and reductionist thought. It questions the reduction of the world to just one 
dimension. It is, however, not just relational and multidimensional; it also sees the world as being in flux 
and development. Development potentialities emerge out of poles that contradict each other. At a certain 
level of organization, everything constantly develops. There are, however, also continuous processes that 
change only at specific critical points. Dialectical development includes situations of crisis and change and 
the emergence of novelty at such critical points. In society, there are two basic forms of the dialectic: One 
has to do with the very basic conditions and the basic development of society. So, for example, there is a 
social dialectic among humans: In order to exist, humans have to communicate with one another. They 
are different individuals, but they can only inform themselves by mutual symbolic interaction. The second 
form of societal dialectic has to do with power relations. In a power dialectic, we find conflicting interests 
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and conflicting structures.  
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The basic assumption, on which a dialectical concept of un/sustainable ICTs in an un/sustainable 
information society is based, is that unsustainability means that there are contradictory interests in the 
production and/or use of digital media technologies, such as, for example, a contradiction between nature 
and society (environmental unsustainability), digital capital and digital labor (economic unsustainability), 
the rulers and the ruled (political unsustainability), or a cultural elite and everyday people (cultural 
unsustainability).  
 
The dimensions of sustainability do not exist independently, but are interdependent—that is, a 
lack of a certain dimension eventually will have negative influences on other dimensions, whereas 
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enrichment of one dimension will provide a positive potential for the enrichment of other dimensions. So, 
for example, people who live in poverty are more likely to not show much interest in political participation. 
Another example is that an unsustainable ecosystem advances an unsustainable society and vice versa: If 
man pollutes nature and depletes nonrenewable natural resources—that is, if he creates an unhealthy 
environment—problems such as poverty, war, totalitarianism, extremism, violence, and crime are more 
likely to occur. And conversely, a society that is shaken by poverty, war, a lack of democracy and 
plurality, and so on is more likely to pollute and deplete nature. So sustainability should be conceived as 
being based on dialectics of ecological preservation, human-centered technology, economic equity, 
political participation, and cultural recognition. These dimensions are held together by the logic of 
cooperation—the notion that systems should be designed in ways that allow all involved actors to benefit. 
Cooperation is the unifying and binding force of a participatory, cooperative, sustainable information 
society. The logic of cooperation dialectically integrates the various dimensions of sustainability. 
 
The World Summit on the Information Society Civil Society Plenary (WSIS, 2005b) argues that, in 
the WSIS process, civil society interests were not adequately taken into account (for a critique of WSIS, 
see also Servaes & Carpentier, 2006).  
 
Internet access, for everybody and everywhere, especially among disadvantaged 
populations and in rural areas, must be considered as a global public good. . . . The 
WSIS documents also mostly focus on market-based solutions and commercial use. Yet 
the Internet, satellite, cable and broadcast systems all utilize public resources, such as 
airwaves and orbital paths. These should be managed in the public interest as publicly 
owned assets through transparent and accountable regulatory frameworks to enable the 
equitable allocation of resources and infrastructure among a plurality of media including 
community media. (WSIS, 2005b, pp. 4, 12) 
 
In its own declaration—which is very different from the official dualistic WSIS outcome 
documents—the WSIS Civil Society Plenary (WSIS, 2003b) argues for an information society that is based 
on 34 inclusive principles. Among them are the promotion of free software and the establishment of a 
public domain of global knowledge that challenges intellectual property. The focus is on public goods and 
redistribution. The Plenary stresses that distributive justice is needed and that economic resources should 
not simply be produced within economic growth models, but rather need to be redistributed:  
 
We aspire to build information and communication societies where development is 
framed by fundamental human rights and oriented to achieving a more equitable 
distribution of resources, leading to the elimination of poverty in a way that is non-
exploitative and environmentally sustainable. (WSIS, 2003b, p. 3) 
 
This article demonstrates that sustainability in the information technology context has played an 
ideological role that aims to advance a neoliberal policy framework that conceives ICTs as a realm of 
private capital accumulation and advances the commodification of communications and society. The 
question that arises in this context is whether, from a critical theory perspective, the sustainability concept 
should therefore be discarded. The view advanced in this article is that a critical social theory should 
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provide an ideology critique of information technology sustainability; at the same time, it should not 
discard, but sublate the sustainability concept into a critical notion of un/sustainable information 
technology sustainability. Such a concept stands in the context of the quest for an alternative framework 
for information technology that goes beyond capital accumulation and aims to advance communications as 
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